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Aesthetics, Authenticities, and Appeals to Authority: 
The Auditor as Author 
By Daniel N Thompson 
The sound may be the object, but man is the subject; and the key to under-
standing music is in the relationships existing between subject and object, the 
activating principle of organization. 
-John Blacking 
Because authenticity is an issue that has periodically arisen within eth-
nomusicology, I have with some interest followed the early-European-
music community's authenticity debates for the past several years. 
Whether "authenticity" is discussed by ethnomusicologists or early-music 
scholars, however, it seems to me that a reasonable response to these de-
bates might be: As an object of study, our understanding of music and its 
practitioners can only benefit from empirical research into historical (or 
other contextual) performance practices. As a vehicle for aesthetic satis-
faction, on the other hand, it seems only natural that there should be a 
plurality of performance practices. 
Although some ethnomusicologsts seem to believe as vehemently in 
"asthetic correctness" as do the most reactionary conservatory teachers, 
most ethnomusicologists have for the past several years accepted aesthetic 
diversity. This aesthetic tolerance, in fact, is what first drew me to ethno-
musicology. What I have therefore found to be most striking about the 
early-music authenticity debates that have taken place is the falsely 
dichotomous "historical authenticity vs. aesthetic correctness" stance often. 
maintained by some of the more vocal members of the (formerly?) main-
stream camp, as well as the corresponding mistake made by some scholars 
and performers from the other side: the conflation of aesthetic superiority 
with historical accuracy.l Taruskin was surely right when he wrote, 
"Authenticity is knowing what you are, and acting in accordance with that 
knowledge" (1995: 67). For many people, however, "aestheticallyauthen-
tic" musical activity includes performing and consuming "historically au-
thentic" early European music. 
In ethnomusicology, we generally start from the presupposition that 
aesthetic sense is not a quantity to be graded on a universal scale (still less 
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to be thought of as a quality that some people have and some people 
don't), but is, rather, a valuable indicator that can often teach us a great 
deal about the people with whom we share music. Consequently, aesthet-
ics- and authenticity-related questions often lead ethnomusicologists to 
questions concerning identity: Authentic for whom? Beautiful for whom? 
Even when scholars acknowledge that there are authenticities rather 
than authenticity, the listener is still too often ignored. For instance, in his 
book entitled Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance, 
Peter Kivy recognizes "historical authenticity" as a category which he fur-
ther divides into three subcategories, each of which is a kind of "faithful-
ness": "These are the notions of (1) faithfulness to the composer's per-
formance intentions; (2) faithfulness to the performance practice of the 
composer's lifetime; [and] (3) faithfulness to the sound of a performance 
during the composer's lifetime" (Kivy 1995: 6-7). He then adds another 
category, which he calls, among other things, "personal authenticity" (108 
ff.), and which he defines as "faithfulness to the performer's own self, origi-
nal, not derivative or an aping of someone else's way of playing" (7, italics 
added).2 
Although most ethnomusicologists would undoubtedly welcome Kivy's 
considerations of the composer's intentions and of performance as "prac-
ticed" during the composer's lifetime (in addition to the more usual at-
tention to the "sound of a performance"), it seems to me that an ethno-
musicologist would (or should) point out that this script calls for more 
characters than just performers and composers. There are also the listen-
ers, who mayor may not be "performers" or "composers"-at least in the 
conventional senses of these terms. 
Let me add, therefore, what I think should be an important component 
to Kivy's performer-centric idea of personal authenticity. There is also 
faithfulness to the [listener's} own self, original, not derivative or an aping of some-
one else's way of [listening} (which includes aping someone else's "listening 
tastes") . 
The consideration of early music's aesthetic appeal for today's audi-
ences, then, requires a shift of musicological attention from composition 
to audition/cognition, from composer to listener, and is reflected in my 
subtitle. Any listener may be asked: Do you like this performance 
(whether live or recorded)? Does it work for you? If a listener is aping the 
listening tastes of another, it seems impossible that the listener can re-
spond honestly, which is to say, respond "faithfully" to him- or herself. 
Postmodernist writers are not the first to locate musical meaning within 
the listener rather than in the musical object. In a statement that prefig-
ures the epigraph by Blacking (1973: 26) at the beginning of this essay, 
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the American liberal pragmatist philosopher John Dewey gave during the 
1930s another description of art-as-process: 
Art is a quality of doing and of what is done. Only outwardly, then, 
can it be designated by a noun substantive .... The product of art ... 
is not the work of art. The work takes place when a human being co-
operates with the product so that the outcome is an experience that 
is enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered properties. (1934: 
214) 
Presumably, then, the work of art changes when the human being 
changes (i.e., is transformed, or replaced with another person). 
"Listening practice" received some attention in the early-European-
music community with the publication of the twenty-fifth-anniversary issue 
of Early Music in November 1997 (its usual section entitled "Performance 
matters" was temporarily retitled "Listening matters"); however, even in 
that commendable issue, the presupposition of "aesthetic correctness" was 
unfortunately evident: 
As the neglected member of the holy trinity of those involved in the 
conception, realization and reception of music, the listener should 
rightly now receive more attention .... You can take, and most peo-
ple naturally do, a totally relativistic view of listening; just as you can 
of performing-anything goes if it works; everyone's reaction is 
equally valid .... But the very effort we all make to try and agree on a 
reaction to a concert shows how wrong is a totally nihilistic view: 
some performances are good and some are bad, and we struggle to ar-
ticulate why. (Kenyon 1997: 555, italics added) 
What does Kenyon mean by "good" here? Historically accurate? Or 
aesthetically pleasing? And who are these people ("we all") who "try and 
agree on a reaction"? And if by "good performances" he means aestheti-
cally pleasing ones, why is it so important that "we all" agree on personal 
constructions such as (what might be called) the "aesthetically good"? (It 
seems to me that when most people try to decide which performances are 
aesthetically good, they are employing essentially the same sort of taste dis-
crimination as when trying to decide which compositions and composers 
are good.) And because some scholars, apparently, try to "agree on a reac-
tion to a concert," how does it follow, therefore, that this shows "how 
wrong is a totally nihilistic view"? Finally, is it nihilism if people have honest 
aesthetic disagreements and then decide not to "try and agree on a reac-
tion to a concert"? 
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The trouble lies in the presupposition that "some performances are 
good and some are bad." As long as the statement is formulated in this way, 
it seems likely that scholars and others will continue, as Kenyon says, to 
"struggle to articulate why." This is a euphemism for saying that scholars 
will continue to argue about the music. It would, of course, be so much 
more accurate to say, "I liked some performances and I didn't like others," 
but this would require us to shift our attention from the sounds to ourselves 
and, under the auspices of the conventional scholarly attitude toward the 
investigation of music, would obviate much of the authority that accrues 
to those who are considered to be experts on various musical topics.3 
The Temporal Orientation of the Auditor 
Perhaps one of the first questions that should be asked when discussing 
any performance is "What does a performer intend to accomplish with this 
performance?" Do performers wish, for instance, to convey what they 
believe the composer wanted to communicate (i.e., the effect he intended 
the music to have on his listeners) or, rather, do they wish to convey the 
musical sound in a manner as historically accurate as possible? For those 
performers for whom it is most important to convey what they believe the 
composer wanted to communicate, it may be important-given the cul-
tural conditioning and expectations of today's audience-to employ other 
means than did the composer during his own lifetime. 
On the other hand, those performers for whom the medium is the mes-
sage (regardless of other considerations) will undoubtedly attempt a best 
effort at the production of historically authentic sounds. If, however, they 
feel that the response the composer may have intended to elicit from his 
audience can best be accomplished by using the same means as did the 
composer (and performers of his time), then they may not have taken ad-
equate account of the fact that audiences have changed.4 
Unfortunately, the audience has too often been ignored in conven-
tional musicology, apparently because of a presupposition on the part of 
some scholars that the audience is just there, inert, with nothing to add to 
the onrushing evolution of Western music. The idea that "pieces" of music 
and performers are variable but that audiences are not helps to lead to 
confusion between the ends and the means of performance. If early-music 
scholars presume that audiences interpret music precisely the same way 
that they did a few hundred years ago, then it would logically seem that 
the use of modern instruments would, indeed, lead to perhaps quite dif-
ferent interpretations. Again, however, because listeners are culturally con-
ditioned very differently from how they were a few hundred years ago, it 
seems entirely reasonable to suppose that different means (e.g., modern 
instruments) might be required to communicate the "original message" 
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(assuming, of course, that we even could know what the composer in-
tended to communicate).5 This argument has sometimes been used by 
those musicians and scholars who reacted negatively to the authentic per-
formance movement, and is an appeal to the traditionalists' authority as 
carriers, particularly in music conservatories, of the Western art music 
tradition. 
The ideal of the unchanged and unchanging audience seems to be pre-
supposed in many standard musicological works. For instance, even in the 
generally measured and reasonable "Performing Practice" article in the 
1980 Grove, the authors presuppose that we can know what a composer 
"imagined." They also seem to assume that the listener is tabula rasa (or is 
at least part of an audience whose musical conditioning has not changed 
at all, even over the course of centuries). 
Reproducing as closely as one can the techniques and timbres 
known to be appropriate to a given period can never replace per-
formances that are musically convincing to the audience; and yet 
the means and style of performance imagined by a composer are so 
indissolubly bound up with the whole musical fabric that he has 
set down, that the communication and impact of the composition are 
seriously impaired if the sounds he imagined are not at least kept in 
mind when preparing modern performances. (Mayer Brown and 
McKinnon 1980: 14:371, italics added) 
"Communication" and "impact" are dependent upon far more than just 
the composer's imagination. (They are also dependent upon more than 
the imaginations of those who imagine what the composer imagined.) 
They are ultimately dependent upon "receivers" (i.e., listeners), and it 
seems unlikely that the ancient composer could have accurately imagined 
the impact that his composition would have on an audience that lives, say, 
a few hundred years into the composer's future. Again, the reason for this 
is that audiences' musical conditioning has undoubtedly changed substan-
tially during the (perhaps many) years that have elapsed from the time of 
composition to the time of today's reception. Furthermore, each listener 
has her own individual historical context; listeners "bring their contexts 
with them" to each concert. In this sense, each listener is, as indicated 
above, her own author. 
Finally, audiences are not the only ones who change. Composers' ideas 
of how they wanted things performed often changed during their own 
lifetimes. In addition to the question "Authentic for whom?" is the obvious 
question "Authentic when?" (a point brought out by, among others, 
Mayer Brown 1988: 28 and Brett 1988: 110). 
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However, an interesting and probably unintended consequence of the 
proliferation of early-music record.ings and performances over the past 
few decades is that ordinary listeners as well as musicians have been in-
creasingly empowered-to experience music that (at least for a large part 
of the musical public) more closely matches their individual aesthetics. In 
other words, different listeners at different times prefer different record-
ings and performances, and although they may not always choose to hear 
the more historically accurate performances, they often do (as shown by 
the vastly increased popularity over the course of the past several years of 
early-music performances that owe little to nineteenth-century musical 
aesthetics). The traditionalists' expostulations about the sterility of histori-
cally accurate performances have too often ignored the fact that many 
early-music listeners (including several of my own personal acquaintances, 
not all of whom are ethnomusicologists) don't care whether the perform-
ances are historically accurate or not; rather, they like the sound of the 
harpsichord, they like the souild of the Baroque violin, they like the 
smaller choir. They simply like it. 
Apparently, however, many traditionalists had been so imbued with 
late-nineteenth-century aesthetic values that they often didn't seem aware 
of their own inherited prejudices. One obvious example is the concept of 
musical expression. A note struck repeatedly by critics of the early-music 
movement has been that "authentic" performances lack expression. What 
strikes me, however, is how unquestioningly have those in the musicologi-
cal mainstream equated wider dynamic ranges, the presence of vibrato, 
much nineteenth-century instrument technology, etc., with greater ex-
pressivity (for one example among many, see Temperley 1984: 16-20). 
These writers seemed to seldom interrogate their own presuppositions re-
garding musical expression. (In other words, I have never read an account 
of a serious consideration of the alternative idea that "less is more,"-i.e., 
less vibrato, dynamic range, etc. might be more expressive.) 
We are fortunate that we have choices. We can listen to Messiah per-
formed with a late-nineteenth-century orchestra or we can hear it per-
formed with Baroque instruments. Many people tend to prefer that with 
which they are familiar, and this is as true of musicians and musicologists 
as it is of the musical layperson. The greatly increased acceptance of early 
music that is performed in a "historically accurate" manner is undoubtedly 
due to the public's increased exposure to it (e.g., there are now numerous 
recordings of early music performed with early instruments; the public 
that listens to European art music is exposed to early-music programs 
on public radio; more craftsmen are making Baroque violins, violas da 
gamba, etc., than in, say, 1910; etc.). This increased activity is due to the 
increased public demand, which is in turn due to increased activity, and so 
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on. Listeners' increasing familiarity with the sonorities of an earlier time 
have multiplied the number of options for music consumers (including 
performers), which has allowed more of us to perform and hear music in 
ways that more closely match our individual tastes (i.e., ways that are per-
sonally authentic) at any given time. In other words, one answer to the 
question "How is a piece of music to be made most convincing/ effective/ 
expressive for today's audience, regardless of the wishes or tools of the 
composer?" may be (depending upon who the auditor is): "This piece of 
music can be made most expressive and convincing by engaging in histori-
cally accurate performance practices." 
The Spatial Orientation of the Auditor 
What of the performance of contemporary music? Three decades ago 
Willi Apel wrote-or at least apparently still believed-that "in the period 
after Bach the problems of performance practice largely disappear, owing 
to the more specific directions of composers for clearly indicating their in-
tentions" (ApelI969: 659). 
The short answer to Apel is that he clearly never attended a rehearsal of 
his own compositions! In regard to the issue of following a composer's 
intentions, living composers may have the option of personally telling per-
formers exactly what they want (or even demonstrating such). Some com-
posers even have the power to dismiss recalcitrant performers; however, 
the disparity between what a composer wants and what the performers 
produce does not disappear simply because a composer may be alive (or 
even present at rehearsals) . 
Perhaps the more important response to Apel's statement is that the 
reason there aren't more performance-practice treatises on works by living 
composers is that the composer whose work is being interpreted might 
publicly dispute the statements of the scholar (and it seems doubtful that 
such contradiction would help any hermeneuticist's career). 
The study of creative tension between performers and living composers 
would be an extension of the relatively recent tendency to include the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries within the matrix of perform-
ance practice. Problems of performance practice remain, moreover, even 
when a composer coaches a rehearsal, the performers have the requisite 
musical skills, and there is every intention on the part of the performers to 
follow the composer's wishes. (Of course, a listener might feel that the 
"mistakes" made in performance make the listening experience "better"-
what might be called "more aesthetically authentic" for that listener.) 
Hans Keller noted in the mid-1980s that the problems of performance 
practice only "end" with computer or electronic music that doesn't re-
quire live performers. "[T]he interpretation of anything except electronic 
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music, which does not need it, is the tail-end of composition" (Keller 
1984: 517). I'm glad to see Keller's emphasis on interpretation, but his 
statement clearly refers to the fact that electronic music does not need 
conventional performers. Performers are certainly interpreters, but there 
are interpreters other than performers. In the case of electronic or com-
puter music, members of the audience are the only interpreters left in the 
equation: problems of interpretation have morphed from issues of per-
formance practice to those oflistening practice. 
One listening-practice issue for live performances is "audience place-
ment," because depending upon where one sits in the auditorium or other 
performance space, one is likely to hear music that is different from what 
the composer intended. We could go further, and say that any two people 
that (hypothetically) sit in the same spot-or that in reality sit in almost 
the same spot-will hear two different things. In both of these cases, per-
formance practice has been transmuted into listening practice, and would 
perhaps more fittingly require the assistance of music-psychological! 
cognitive and ethnomusicological methods and theories during investiga-
tion and explication. 
Audience placement is of course important not only for computer mu-
sic. Nicholas Kenyon notes in his introduction to Authenticity and Early 
Music: A Symposium that "Berlioz was explored in a Norrington weekend 
in London in March 1988, which included successful performances of 
both the Symphonie fantastique and Romeo and Juliet using not only period 
instruments but adapted 'period' seating plans for orchestra and chorus" 
(1988: 11). 
But how about a seating plan for the audience? Although the reception 
of Berlioz's music might not be greatly affected, it seems !likely enough that 
for performances of at least some works-certain secular works by earlier 
composers, for example-the audience should be eating, drinking, and 
otherwise making merry. In his contribution to the same volume, Robert 
Morgan takes account of this part of the problem: "[E] arly music was not 
intended to be performed in concert. Indeed, if we take the notion of 
context at all seriously, we are left with the painful realization that any 
concert performance of this music constitutes a basic perversion of its 
original intentions" (1988: 71). (Morgan doesn't indicate why he finds this 
realization "painful.") 
For absolutely authentic performances-to continue this line of 
thought-we should probably duplicate the size of the original concert 
hall, the design of the auditorium, the materials of which it was made, and 
on and on, until-in order to include the listeners' perception/cognition 
-we finally arrive at considerations of audience placement as well as 
the individual histories of the original listeners. Clearly, however, this ever-
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expanding spiral of consideration cannot continue indefinitely. Although 
the audience is not a homogeneous mass, we obviously have to "draw the 
line" somewhere. Nevertheless, the boundary that delimits admissible evi-
dence is the boundary beyond which lies the impossible, purist's ideal of 
absolute authenticity. 
The perception-and-cognition/audience-placement dilemma can be 
easily illustrated with an example from my own research on Irish music in 
New York. At a seisiun [sessionJ-in which the aesthetics of the concert 
hall play little part-players sit in a group and perform tunes (usually reels 
and sometimes jigs) from memory. For the past several decades, seisiuin 
have generally taken place in bars and pubs. There is usually a significant 
amount of ambient noise present, which is expected (and often pre-
ferred) by the musicians. Players come and go throughout the evening, 
and although there exists a concept called "session etiquette," informality 
reigns. 
Which versions of the tunes played are authentic? It depends on whom 
you ask. It also depends on when you ask, where you ask, how you ask, 
and, perhaps most importantly, why you ask. It probably also depends on 
where the listener is sitting. What does she hear? If she moves to another 
seat she will hear something different. Is the performance she now hears 
more authentic than what she heard a moment before? Or less so? 
The musicians who attend sessions perform music-usually learned 
without the aid of notation-in a venue where people are eating and 
drinking and where listening to music is not the primary objective for 
much of the "audience." It might therefore be objected that this situation 
is so entirely different from listening to music in the concert hall that it 
won't bear comparison. But the problems of perception/ cognition still 
exist. It can be said that when one sits in a different spot in the concert 
hall, one is listening to a different "version" of the music, that the sounds 
are, in fact, different music. 
For instance, during a seisiun, the dynamic balance of the instruments 
changes if the listener changes seats. There is no perfect place for a lis-
tener to sit, particularly during ensemble playing (and the larger the en-
semble, the more complex become problems of dynamic balance). This 
problem is not obviated in the recording studio: if a recording is made 
and dynamic balance is attained electronically in the studio, is it then an 
"authentic" recording? Or not? 
This issue has also been raised in the case of early European cultivated 
music: "The sound technician has become a main participant in the inter-
pretation of early music" (Goldberg 1997: 571). Morgan notes the same 
philosophical problem with regard to the "hyperrealism" of certain visual 
artists: "All details are rendered with a sort of absolute distinctness, 
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thereby acquiring a degree of 'purity' inconceivable in the realm of actual 
visual experience. Everything is equally in focus .... Are these painters in 
fact presenting reality 'as it really is'?" (1988: 74-75). He says later that the 
world depicted "is in fact one that could never be directly experienced" 
(1988: 75). In fact, in shifting the emphasis of investigation from music 
object to human subject, Dewey, Blacking, and others have continued the 
line of investigation employed by thinkers at least as far back as 
Aristoxenus (364-304 BCE), who argued that "music appreciation can only 
be understood by studying the mind of the listener, not the external col-
lection of sounds that impinge upon the ear" (this translation cited in 
Levitin 1999: 505). 
Appeals to Authority 
Looking back on the past few decades, it seems that the practitioners of 
"historical" performances have generally claimed that their authority is 
based on historical accuracy. The traditionalist performers, critics, and 
musicologists, on the other hand, apparently derive their authority from 
their traditional influence on Western art music performance and study, 
as well as from their own individual interpretive acuity. It seems, however, 
that each camp was really fighting for authority itself (i.e., fighting for con-
trol of the early-music narrative). And in order to claim authority for 
themselves, they appealed to what they both considered a higher author-
ity: the composer. Crutchfield's statement below is an example of appeal 
to a different authority: 
Authenticity implies authority, and ultimately an author. The author 
of a performance-of a bow stroke, a crescendo, an impulse, a radi-
ant act of absorption-is the performer, with whose condition we 
must be concerned if authenticity is what we're after. (Crutchfield 
1988:26) 
I agree with this as far as it goes, but if the author of a performance is the 
performer, then the author of the listening experience is the auditor, be-
cause it doesn't, after all, matter what either the composer or performer in-
tends to transmit if the message is perceived differently from what either 
of them had intended. "Transmission" cannot be separated from its per-
ceiver.6 
Although absolutely authentic performances are obviously impossible, it 
nonetheless seems extraordinary that the early-music movement was so ve-
hemently attacked in the scholarly press. I suspect that at least part of the 
reason is that many in the "authentic performance" movement ignored 
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the aesthetics lectures of their critics. In doing so, they empowered the au-
dience as well as themselves. The net effect is that Western art music's nar-
rative is no longer explicated exclusively by traditionalist musicologists 
(i.e., musicologists whose aesthetic sensibilities are largely a product of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and its performance is no 
longer largely controlled by musicians immersed in fin-de-siecle perform-
ance practices of a hundred years ago. In other words, the reason why the 
mainstream so vociferously attacked the proponents of early instruments 
and early-music performance practices is that during the last few decades 
of the twentieth century the scholar-critics' views had become increasingly 
irrelevant to many performers of early music as well as to much of the 
record-buying and concert-going public. 
As mentioned before, what both the authenticists and the traditionalists 
had in common was an appeal to authority. Authenticists appealed to the 
authority of (what they hoped were) historical facts, and traditionalists 
appealed to the authority of their positions as experts who, through both 
conventional practice and intuition, "knew" what composers had intended 
(or who knew-at times-even better than the composer7). 
Some "nonauthenticists" have argued for "more interpretation" and 
less dependence on "cold facts," but it seems that they have often been 
only interested in more of their own interpretations (which is logical, I 
suppose, if one indeed takes the position that, due to one's own authori-
tative "intuition," one's own aesthetics should be universal). Taruskin's 
statement that "what is only personal is irrelevant" (1988: 153) seems to 
express the modernist belief that in the realm of aesthetics there is a right 
and a wrong. (Another way of saying this is that in order for there to be 
winners, there must be losers.) The rules of this game would undoubtedly 
tend to make anyone combative because they virtually dictate that scholars 
must fear a loss of power if they are unable to force others to adopt their 
aesthetic preferences. Aesthetics decisions, however, are highly personal 
matters, and it seems likely that no individual listener's aesthetic sensibil-
ity will be exactly the same as any other listener's. Because they are per-
sonal, they will not validly conform to any other listener's aesthetic 
agenda. In fact, in a listener-centric model, only the personal is relevant. 
Furthermore, although it may be true that "the choice of what to make 
into a 'text' can only proceed from a rather thorough understanding of 
the historical context and its implications" (Brett 1988: 107), to what de-
gree should the scholar's historical context enter our considerations of the 
history he writes? In his contribution to Authenticity and Early Music Gary 
Tomlinson makes his own bid for authority, replacing the authority of per-
formers as well as specialists in early-music scholarship with the authority 
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of the cultural historian. In his article, he writes that the more context we 
know, the fuller will be our historical (factual?) appreciation of a piece of 
musIC. 
I agree. It is important to point out, however, that the people who at-
tend concerts and read program notes-as well as the scholars who study 
monographs on the history of Western art music-would have an even 
greater understanding of what the historian writes if they understood the 
context out of which the historian works. In other words, to have an even 
fuller understanding of the history of a piece of music, we need to know as 
much as we can about the historian's life (i.e., his or her own historical 
context). Then we might have a better understanding of why the historian 
has chosen to highlight some aspects of the history of a piece of music, 
and not others; why he chose to study this music or composer, and not 
others. 
The authentic meaning of a musical work is not the meaning that its 
creators and first audience invested in it. It is instead the meaning 
that we, in the course of interpretative historical acts of various sorts, 
come to believe its creators and audience invested in it. ... [T]he au-
thentic meanings of a work arise from our relating it to an array of 
things outside itself that we believe gave it meaning in its original con-
text. ... Such interpretation is the province especially of the cultural 
historian, and the authentic meanings gained through it are given 
fullest voice through his or her methods. (Tomlinson 1988: 115, 123, 
italics added) 
We? To whom does Tomlinson refer? Other historians, perhaps? If so, 
he seems to appropriate for himself and other historians authentic mean-
ings, which apparently leaves inauthentic meanings to the rest of us. (This 
is problematic, for what happens when the cultural historians disagree? 
Who are we, then?) It might seem at first that a shift to "meaning" is a sig-
nal that we are for the moment no longer considering "historical truth." 
But a shift from "authenticity" to that of "authentic meaning" doesn't re-
ally help, nor does the shifting of his terminology from the singular "au-
thentic meaning" to the plural "authentic meanings." Tomlinson seems to 
be saying that because cultural historians know more facts about the past 
than do other people, the meanings that they project onto a musical per-
formance are authentic. (In an about-face, however, he denies the value 
of the "objective" knowledge of the one group that conceivably knew 
more about their environment than do today's historians: the people who 
actually lived during the historical periods discussed.) 
I would have felt better if, in the first line of the immediately preceding 
extract, Tomlinson had at least written, "Our authentic meaning ofa musi-
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cal work is not the meaning that its creators ... " or "For us, the authentic 
meaning of a musical work .... " He has stated the above in such a way that 
it seems he presupposes an Authentic Meaning (or Authentic Meanings) 
irrespective of the passage of time, and that he is merely substituting the 
new authority of cultural history for the other authorities (conventional 
musicology, historical authenticity, the conservatory tradition-even the 
authority of performers who were contemporaries of the composer). 
It is doubtful that it is any easier to separate the historian from the his-
tory than it is to separate the musical work from "its" history. As men-
tioned above, however, this ever-widening net of consideration must be 
delimited. In order to use language we have to draw the line somewhere, 
and-because I have observed that many scholars would prefer to speak 
about objects and events "outside themselves" as if they were able to do so 
independently of their own personal histories-I suspect that it is easiest 
to draw this line in such a way that it separates us from the world we are 
supposedly objectively observing. 
Taruskin has written that "old instruments and old performance prac-
tices are in themselves of no aesthetic value," which is undoubtedly true, 
but nothing is "in itself" of any aesthetic value whatsoever. He then says 
that "the claim of self-evidence for the virtue of adhering to a composer's 
'intentions' is really nothing but a mystique" (1984: 3, 7), but it's difficult 
to understand how this is more of a mystique than the authority claimed 
by the performer or scholar who either challenges the composer's inten-
tions, or who claims that the composer actually intended something differ-
ent from what might be indicated in the score. 
* * * 
Looking back, it seems clear that the historical performance movement 
won most of the battles (if not the entire war) because it has increased 
the number of listening choices available to the consumer (and if a lis-
tener viscerally enjoys particular performances and recordings, it seems 
doubtful that any amount of hectoring in scholarly journals will-or 
should-affect that enjoyment). The early-music performers have not pro-
vided us with just one historically authentic version of each piece of early 
music; instead, they have given us a number of performances and record-
ings that we might enjoy (some of which-depending upon how we define 
the terms-are probably more historically accurate than others). The sev-
eral different recorded renditions continue to be added to those we al-
ready own or have heard, and if a significant number of listeners respond 
enthusiastically, then these sundry performances are undoubtedly aesthet-
ically convincing for those people, regardless of where these performances 
may fall on the continuum of historical authenticity. 
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Today we can listen to music from almost any place on the planet and 
from almost any historical period, and the increasing popularity of musics 
that for the contemporary West are both spatially and temporally distant is 
strong evidence that many listeners-including musicians-clearly enjoy 
this variety. How far can one go in interpreting a piece of music? (For 
many members of the musical public, the most aesthetically convincing 
performances of plainchant are those that employ drum machines and 
synthesizer washes; for many, the most convincing performances of Bach 
can only be accomplished on a grand piano.) Traditionalists probably 
have come to realize that their arguments for "intuition" can be used 
against them by supporting interpretations that many of them would 
never condone, for there are certainly as many aesthetically authentic ways 
to perform (and appreciate) music as there are listeners. 
I suspect also that the debates have died down because scholars and 
critics have slowly come to understand that there isn't really anything to 
fight over. It seems doubtful that the early-instrument performers have 
taken away a great number of audience members from the mainstream 
(which is to say that the lovers of traditionalist performance practices have 
not suddenly stopped patronizing their favorite performers). The dissemi-
nation of early music isn't a zero-sum game. 
I submit that what has happened instead is that a new audience has 
been created, and in a brief attempt at the sort of disclosure I have asked 
for above, I should admit that I am a part of this audience. For one exam-
ple among many: I have never responded positively to heavy vocal vibrato, 
and once I began to listen more frequently to early music, I found refresh-
ing the light, or even absent, vibrato. Furthermore, it is a matter of his tori-
cal interest to me that early instruments, for example, are more historically 
accurate conveyors of early musical sound than later instruments; how-
ever, what is primarily important to me is that I generally find their sounds 
to be more pleasing. 
For that portion of this new early-music audience that has been drawn 
from pop and "folk" music audiences, I suspect that the congeniality of 
certain early-music performance practices (e.g., reduced vocal vibrato, use 
of lutes and other early instruments) together with other aspects of much 
of this music (e.g., generally straightforward harmonies, relatively narrow 
dynamic ranges, etc.) is due to the fact that these attributes are often ex-
hibited by the vernacular musics with which this audience is already famil-
iar. (In fact, the investigation of audiences' perceptions of how "common 
practice" and early music compare with selected genres of popular music 
might constitute an interesting ethnomusicological project. The re-
searcher would have to engage identity issues, of course, because listeners' 
cognition of the music cannot be separated from their own personal his-
torical contexts.) 
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Empirical researchers-the results of whose investigations have in-
creased the number of performance choices for listeners in the present-
should recognize that an increased understanding of the past should be 
the primary motivation for their historical research. "Historical authentic-
ity" should never be used as a stick to beat others when the issues involved 
are, in truth, aesthetic. Still, empirical research is an enterprise that 
builds on itself, its value eventually becoming evident to even its most en-
trenched opponents. Polemical essays on aesthetics, on the other hand, 
are themselves aesthetic objects, which may please because of their rhetor-
ical force or the erudition displayed by the author, but as vehicles that 
convey anything other than the personal preferences of the writer, become 
increasingly irrelevant (and valued more and more for only their perfor-
mative qualities). With the benefit of hindsight, Nigel Rogers's words now 
seem prophetic: 
It should not be necessary to remind scholars that they are also sub-
ject to change, even if perhaps less mercurially than performers 
are .... The derision and oblivion that the scholars are happy to re-
mind us are waiting for us round the next corner may be waiting for 
them round the one after that. (1984: 525) 
Empirical research is hard work, whether done in the field or in an 
archive. It often requires long, irregular hours, extended periods of travel 
away from home, and tedious, painstaking tasks. It is, in the parlance of 
economists, labor-intensive. Perhaps it is easier to publish opinion pieces 
that promote one's aesthetics. But why bother to argue about the aesthet-
ics of music? I'm reminded of a statement made by Arthur C. Clarke in re-
gard to certain political and economic issues, although in this context I 
would substitute "aesthetics": "The time will come when most of our pres-
ent controversies on these matters will seem as trivial, or as meaningless, 
as the theological debates in which the keenest minds of the Middle Ages 
dissipated their energies" (Clarke 1962: 13). 
* * * 
As noted above, "Authenticity implies authority, and ultimately an au-
thor" (Crutchfield 1988: 26). In any case, authority has often followed 
authorship'. With the advent of audio recordings, however, a new type of 
document made its appearance, and with it, an implied challenge to 
"print" authorities. In Authenticity and Early Music Taruskin calls audio 
recordings '''documents' of a special narcissistic kind" (1988: 143). How 
so? Are they any more inherently narcissistic than essays? In the same 
book, Howard Mayer Brown incisively warns that "personal commitment 
is a necessary virtue for performers (who ought not to play music in a 
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particular style unless they are in sympathy with it), but it may be a luxury 
to which scholars ought not to aspire" (1988: 55). Nonetheless, too many 
of the articles and essays on authenticity that have appeared throughout 
the past several years seem to me to be themselves performances in which 
"personal commitment" is indulged to the point that it seems to devour 
the other "necessary virtue [s]." (This is not to say, of course, that there 
should be no place for the airing of aesthetic opinion: newspaper reviews 
of musical performances and audio recordings are perfectly legitimate ve-
hicles for this type of rhetoric, as well as for the emotional, "huffing and 
puffing" mode of discourse that is often a part of the critical perform-
ance.) 
The devotees of early instruments and "historically authentic" perform-
ances have undoubtedly enriched the musical landscape, and in reviewing 
the reactionary responses of many of those who, throughout most of the 
twentieth century, could still be referred to as mainstream musicologists, it . 
seems to me that these fights have really been as much about the authority 
and power of entrenched musicological interests and the legitimacy of the 
opinions of those who hold power as they have been about aesthetic cor-
rectness. I suspect, therefore, that although most performers will generally 
continue to engage in the performance practices they find most congen-
ial, it is probably important for musicologists to continue to ask two 
groups of questions: What kinds of questions are we asking, and why? Is it 
necessary that others agree with our findings, and if so, why? 
Aesthetics issues are, essentially, identity issues. Who are we that we lis-
ten to early music? (When I attend a concert by Columbia University's 
Collegium Musicum at the University Chapel, I find in attendance a very 
different audience from that which attends a Sunday matinee perform-
ance of Schumann at Avery Fisher Hall.) Music lovers who many years ago 
may have enjoyed, for instance, the Mormon Tabernaclle Choir's versions 
of Messiah were eventually told that the performances they enjoyed were 
not authentic. This news was not always warmly welcomed.s It seems to me 
that there are a number of ways to respond to such a charge: 1) Agree that 
the performances may not be terribly authentic but continue to enjoy 
them anyway; 2) Be afraid that by preferring the historically "inauthentic" 
performance one is being aesthetically incorrect, and then lie about one's 
true preferences in order to gain acceptance to the musicologically savvy 
crowd; 3) Argue that historical authenticity doesn't matter, that the only 
thing that does matter is one's own (universally correct) aesthetic opin-
ions, and that opposing aesthetic opinions are therefore "wrong." 
Why have so many scholars and performers apparently needed to ap-
peal to authority in order to justify their personal tastes? When the topic is 
aesthetics, "Does it work for you?" is the only question that ultimately mat-
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ters, which implies the demise of criticism that attempts to universalize its 
authors' aesthetics-particularly those writings that employ argument-
from-authority. Understanding a listener's aesthetic sensibility is probably 
one of the richest avenues to understanding more of the whole person; 
moreover, the ultimate value of aesthetics is precisely due to the fact that 
everyone's aesthetic sensibility is different. 
Notes 
* Several people were kind enough to critique an earlier version of this paper. 
My thanks to all of them, particularly Mark Burford, Rebecca Kim, Amanda Minks, 
Maryam Moshaver, and Davy Temperley. Special thanks to James Currie and Carl 
Voss. 
l. Rather than engage in lengthy written qualifications each time I mention 
these two "camps" (which I have necessarily essentialized, to some degree), I will 
refer to them as "authenticists" and "traditionalists." 
2. In his contribution to Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium, Philip Brett 
makes reference to Peter Shillingsburg's "four editorial orientations, the histori-
cal, the aesthetic, the authorial, and the sociological on the basis of where the tex-
tual critic locates authority .... Yet in essence they can be reduced to the historical 
and the critical" (1988: Ill). 
3. Although there is probably more potential for disagreement when consider-
ing aesthetic value, the determination of even historical authenticity is largely deter-
mined by those parameters that we-as a culture or as individuals-have decided 
to privilege. To consider just one simple example: Is it more historically accurate 
to playa Bach harpsichord piece on a piano, or on a synthesizer that sounds like a 
harpsichord? It depends, obviously, upon which aspects of the keyboard we have 
decided to examine. If we focus upon timbre, for example, we must choose the 
synthesizer; if we privilege the instrument-making technology that existed closest 
to Bach's own time, we must choose the piano. 
4. To take a different example for a moment: A common physical gesture, 
used all over the world, will often have very different meanings in different cul-
tures, whether those cultures are separated temporally or spatially, and this is true 
for any number of gestures, facial expressions, visual symbols, etc. The opposite is 
also true: the "same" message can often be transmitted only by using different 
means. 
5. The Buddhist maxim "To change with change is the changeless state" per-
fectly encapsulates the argument that makes the claim that in order to perceive 
the same verities as did audiences hundreds of years ago-assuming, again, that we 
even could know such a thing-it will probably be necessary to employ different 
means of performance. 
6. The inadequacy of noun-centered language to describe uninterrupted 
process has often been noted in works of literature. Yeats's rhetorical question 
"How can we know the dancer from the dance?" is one well-known example. 
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7. See, for instance, Hans Nathan's comment from the 1950s: "A composer 
cannot always be expected to give an 'authentic' rendition of his own music" 
(Nathan 1952: 91). 
8. "Discussion ... as to the nature and purpose of authentic performance styles 
has led ... to [a] ... reaction on the part of some musicians against the idea of au-
thenticity, or, as they would say, against a mindless obsession with authenticity. 
Their [reaction] can be attributed in part to ... hurt feelings on the part of those 
musicians criticized on the grounds that they are inauthentic" (Mayer Brown 1988: 
53-54). 
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